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(__) We need to concentrate on combating bioterrorism
Blum, Research Professor of Health Law at Loyola University School of Law, 2002 (John D., Lawyering for a new democracy, Wisconsin Law Review, pg. Lexis-Nexis)
A great deal of legal commentary has focused on federalism in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent opinions in the area. n58 A careful examination of the current federalism opinions demonstrates that these decisions do nothing to alter Congress's ability to use the power of the purse to circumvent the states, and if an arm of the federal government is limited by the Court, it is the federal courts, not Congress, that are most directly affected. n59 The Clinton administration [*618] issued Executive Order 13,083, which dealt with federalism and bolstered federal power, but it was rescinded as a result of opposition from state governors. n60 During the George W. Bush administration, a seemingly more conciliatory approach towards the states was included as an early administration agenda item, n61 but this appears to have given way to the realities of a post-September 11th world in which Washington needs to retain considerable power, particularly in areas involving public health threats such as bioterrorism.

(__) Anthrax attack prove bioterrorism is real
Kellman, Professor of Law and Director, Spring 2002 (Barry, An International Criminal Law Approach to Bioterrorism, Wisconsin Law Review, pg. Lexis-Nexis)
Bioterrorism is a reality, and we are all threatened. n1 We need to make critical choices without delay. The recent anthrax attacks of Autumn 2001 have nullified any resort to relaxed deliberation. Because response measures, no matter how elaborate, cannot confine the spread of disease and panic within acceptable limits, our choices must focus on preventing terrorists from acquiring or developing biological weapons. n2 Thus, there is an inexorable linkage between preventing biological terrorism and controlling biological weapons.

(__) Global action against bioterrorism need
Kellman, Professor of Law and Director, Spring 2002 (Barry, An International Criminal Law Approach to Bioterrorism, Wisconsin Law Review, pg. Lexis-Nexis)
The ease with which pathogens can be carried or shipped means that unilateral action cannot prevent bioterrorism. Investigators may uncover a secret laboratory in the United States, but a laboratory in most other parts of the world could easily escape detection, and operations could proceed with minimal risk. Robust domestic regulatory and law enforcement capabilities alone would have negligible ability to detect foreign terrorists who are developing biological agents nor to prevent someone from bringing weaponized agents to the United States.

In view of the potential magnitude of casualties, n8 it makes sense to consider ways of reducing the risk that weapons quality biological agents from a foreign source will be used against the United States. n9 Successful measures to combat bioterrorism should include attempts to identify covert biological weapons activities and to interdict those activities as well as transnational [*724] movements of deadly pathogens. The current capabilities to detect or interdict pathogens are worse than inadequate; these capabilities are virtually non-existent.


(__) Understanding bioterrorism and using funds to combat it is needed
Blum, Research Professor of Health Law at Loyola University School of Law, 2002 (John D., Lawyering for a new democracy, Wisconsin Law Review, pg. Lexis-Nexis)
A strategy for combating bioterrorism must be grounded in an understanding of the realities of biological weapons. During the last decade, if not before, at least two conditions have become strikingly evident, and these realities are decisive in determining the appropriateness of alternative control measures.

First, the deliberate spread of plague or ebola now has little military utility for states with sufficient technology to prepare such weapons. Although state military programs have developed biological weapons and can do so again, the implications of devastating retaliation against such activity provide a significant safeguard. Acquisition of biological weapons by non-state terrorists, however, is a rapidly growing concern because deterrence is less effective in dealing with terrorists. Biological weapons are devastatingly effective against civilian populations, whether against one's own subjects or foreigners. Moreover, biological weapons are uniquely effective at spreading panic, which is often a prime terrorist objective. n33 Biological weapons can also be inflicted discreetly, enabling terrorists to flee after an attack, but before law enforcement personnel are on full alert. The important point here is that disarmament and non-proliferation measures are likely to be inapposite for addressing biological weapons threats--a control strategy that does not [*729] focus on terrorist acquisition and use of biological weapons is wrongly directed.

Second, capabilities for producing biological weapons are ubiquitous, but capabilities for verifying their non-production are illusory. Any reasonably-equipped biological research laboratory or bio-pharmaceutical facility has the capacity to make biological weapons quickly and, just as quickly, to eliminate any trace of that activity. n34 In view of the large number of these facilities, deciding what to look for and where to examine is tantamount to guessing. n35 Even if a robust inspection scheme could be conceived, it could be easily circumvented. Moreover, while weaponizing biological agents is far from a trivial undertaking, it is not so difficult that terrorists, much less a state, would be compelled to employ observable bio-pharmaceutical facilities. On the contrary, biological weapons can and would likely be made in covert facilities unrelated to any declared sites, especially if legitimate bio-pharmaceutical enterprises are subject to international monitoring. Even the most effective and lowest-cost verification system directed at the legitimate bio-pharmaceutical sector would not likely detect, prevent, or reduce the risk of bioterrorism to any substantial degree.

Combined, these realities of biological weapons signify that the Protocol is the right answer to the wrong problem. It propounds a reasonably balanced scheme to verify the unverifiable, while being significantly inattentive to dangerous behavior pursued covertly by non-state terrorism. n36 There is no point in arguing, therefore, whether the proposed BWC Protocol is more or less effective, burdensome, or intrusive than alternative verification tactics. Once we understand that the inherent nature of the problem does not lend itself to an arms control approach, then the important discussion must focus on alternative approaches.