CONTENTION 1 : INHERENCY
THE US NAVY HAS BEEN GRANTED THE ABILITY TO TEST LOW FREQUENCY ACTIVE SONAR OR LFAS WHICH HAS PROVEN TO KILL MARINE ANIMALS, AND PENDING LITIGATION WILL INITAT A FULL DEPLOYMENT AFFECTING 75% OF THE WORLD’S OCEANS
Lauren Linden, http://www.sanmateocountytimes.com/cda/article/print/0%2C1674%2C87~11268~733805%2C00.html, May 16, 2003, “Navy Exempted From Sonar Limits”
Around the globe, nations are testing and beginning to deploy "active marine mammals. It has been conclusively linked to the deaths of seven whales in sonar" technology, which uses extremely loud sound to detect submarines. The problem? Active sonar can injure and even kill marine animals the Bahamas in March 2000; that stranding is only one of a mounting number of similar events.
The U.S. Navy has led the push toward use of active sonar. In full knowledge of the disastrous effects that active sonar's intense noise may have on whale populations all over the world, the Navy has also conducted testing in complete secrecy and has consistently evaded and violated environmental law.
In July 2002, despite strong concerns from many leading scientists, the Bush administration issued a long-sought permit allowing the Navy to use the biggest gun in its active-sonar arsenal, the SURTASS LFA system, in as much as 75 percent of the world's oceans. NRDC filed a lawsuit to stop deployment of the system, and in October 2002 won a preliminary injunction against broad deployment of the LFA system. The judge held that the administration's permit to deploy LFA likely violates a number of federal laws, including the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act. The judge also agreed that the science clearly demonstrates "the possibility, indeed probability, of irreparable injury" to marine mammals should LFA sonar be deployed widely.
NRDC litigators will soon face off with the Bush administration in federal court to determine whether this dangerous technology is finally unleashed upon entire populations of whales and other marine mammals -- or whether it should be permanently blocked until the Navy obeys the law and demonstrates that LFA will not cause serious harm to ocean life.























CONTENTION 2 : ADVANTAGES
ADVANTAGE 1 : WHALES

1. LFA SONAR THREATENS THE SURVIVAL OF AN ENTIRE POPULATION OF WHALES WITH IT’S FIRST DEPLOYMENT
Sea Shepherd Conservation Society , http://www.seashepherd.org/media_info2.asp?ID=26 06/13/03
Scientists are warning that LFA sonar may threaten the very survival of entire populations of whales, some already teetering on the brink of extinction. At close range, the system's shock waves are so intense they can destroy a whale's eardrums, cause its lungs to hemorrhage, and even kill.
Further away, LFA noise can cause permanent hearing loss in marine mammals after a single transmission. At 40 miles away, LFA noise is still so intense it can disrupt the mating, feeding, nursing and other essential activities of marine mammals.

2. EVEN IF THE AFFECTED WHALES ARE NOT KILLED IMMEDIATELY ALL ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS ARE STRIPPED AND EXTINCTION IS INEVITABLE. ‘
CNN, ww.cnn.com/NATURE/9906/30/sea.noisepart1 6/30/99
Repeated exposure to moderately loud sounds can damage human ears, as rock musicians have learned.
Even milder sounds can be annoying, stressful, distracting (picture the golfer about to swing) or confusing.
Some sounds attract whales toward boats, making them more vulnerable to collision. Sometimes whales fall silent. Sperm and pilot whales stopped "singing" (using their active sonar) altogether during a 220 decibel test in 1991, some of them for days, which meant they were not eating during that time. Whales may fall silent to hide from their sharp-eared predators (killer whales, or orcas). Because silence evolved as their survival response, they hush at any strange noise. When they're not using their active sonar, whales are not courting potential mates, and they may not be finding food. Deep-water whales, the kind with teeth, are thought to use echolocation (active sonar) for navigation and hunting. Sounds booming at regular intervals also could interfere with whales' sleep. Little is known about how whales and dolphins sleep, except that they must surface to breathe. "In humans, prolonged or repeated noises can cause difficulties in falling asleep, changes in sleep patterns, and awakenings," says the often-cited book "Marine Mammals and Noise" by W. John Richardson et al. Chronic noise may lead to high blood pressure in humans, and strong noise can affect reproduction and rearing of young in land animals, Richardson's book adds. Repeated stress can take a toll on an animal's immune system, leaving it more vulnerable to parasites and other infections.

3. THE PROTECTION OF A WHALES RIGHT TO LIVE IS THE FORMOST
GOAL, PLAN IS A FIRST STEP IN THE BREAKDOWN OF ANTHRO - AND
ANDRO – CENTRISM <>
Anthomy D’Amatao, AJIL board of editors AND Sudhir K. Chopraattorney for the US EPA in Dalls 1/91. American Journal of International Law, lexis
Those who would deny whales the right to live use a similar rationalization. To be sure, whales are not human, but are they "less" than human? The mind set that exults in the killing of whales and the "sports" hunting of endangered wildlife species overlaps with the mind set that accepts genocide of "inferior" human beings. Conversely, the extension of rights to whales resonates deeply with the historical-legal extensions of equal rights to women and to minority groups. We believe that the phrase "human rights" is only superficially species chauvinistic. [FN33] In a profound sense, whales and some other sentient mammals are entitled to human rights or at least to humanist rights-- to the most fundamental entitlements that we regard as part of the humanitarian tradition. They are entitled to those fundamental rights not because they are "less" than human but because they are "different" from humans in various respects that do not affect or qualify the rights in question. In this article we argue only for extending the single most fundamental of all human rights-- the right to life--to whales. [FN34]

ADVANTAGE 2 : PLANKTON
1. PLANKTON ARE THE UNNOTICED VICTIMS OF LFAS
Cheryl A. Magill, RESEARCH PROJECT WITH THE HEARTLINK, EKG to EEG to Dolphin Harmonics.., http://www.zayra.de/soulcom/dolphin/, 1998
- Perhaps it is no coincidence that Hawaii newspapers were filled with
concern this year about the dramatically reduced fish resources and turtle
populations in Hawaiian waters as well as concerns about coral beds
following the sonar tests conducted in the winter of 1998. Since sonar is
capable of tissue shearing and lung explosion of the larger mammals, it
certainly would cause the death of smaller marine life and fish or even plankton and coral which are not even being considered or studied during this controversy.

2. SOUND EFFECTS ON PLANKTON MEAN END OF ALL OCEAN LIFE AND DESTROYS BIODIVERSITY.
Gretel H. Schueller, 2001 Environment Hawai`i, Inc. Volume 12 Number 2 (August 2001)
As the NMFS works on its rulings, opponents are assembling a battle plan. "We're trying to find studies on the effects of sound on ocean life," explains Green. "If we can show that that kind of sound level affects endangered species, under the Endangered Species Act you can't do it." Green is also looking at effects on some of the ocean's smallest inhabitants: plankton. Plankton are "the bottom of the food chain," she says. "If plankton are affected, everything goes in the ocean."


3. LOSS OF BIODIVERSITY MEANS EXTINCTION
The Ocean Channel http://www.ocean.com/Conservation/OceanPollution.asp 2001
Ocean pollution is a problem that directly affects sea life. It indirectly affects human health. Healthy oceans are vital to sustaining all life on Earth. Covering approximately 75% of the earth's surface, our oceans provide food, natural resources, recreation and precious life-saving medicines for many people. Care of the oceans protects the survival of not only land dwellers, but also maintains the well being and biodiversity of the inhabitants of the ocean as well. Sustaining and preserving the ocean's unique organisms and habitats protects all life on earth for future generations.







4. PLANKTON ARE A KEY NEGATIVE FEEDBACK TO PREVENT GLOBAL WARMING

By the BBC's John Duce BBC News Online September 20, 2000
Scientists in Germany believe that two species of plankton found in massive quantities in the world's oceans may be able to counteract global warming. The marine organisms are capable of absorbing the equivalent amount of carbon emissions to those produced by a large country like Germany over several years, the research suggests. ... In a new report in the journal Nature, they also warn that the carbon dioxide build-up in the atmosphere could be having a major effect on the oceans' fragile ecosystem. Carbon sink As one of the main greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide acts like a blanket, trapping heat and increasing the temperature on the Earth's surface. Scientists have long known that the world's oceans take up much of the carbon dioxide in the Earth's atmosphere. Researchers at the Alfred Wegener Institute in Bremerhaven, Germany, have found that two common types of ocean plankton appear to absorb high amounts of the gas. The tiny marine plants and animals may take up more carbon dioxide when atmospheric concentrations increase, potentially offering a negative biological feedback against global warming.


5.GLOBAL WARMING IS THE END OF THE WORLD
John Leslie 1996 (Prof Emeritus of Philosophy @ U of Guelph & Fellow @ Royal Society of Canada.) The End of the World
The most serious greenhouse danger could be of runaway positive feedback. Here we have the horrid example of Venus. Primitive life may perhaps actually have evolved there but now a dense atmosphere, almost all of it CO2 gives greenhouse temperatures of around 450 degrees C. Whereas a level of 0.5 per cent new non – linear effects come into play and the heating greatly increases, Lovelock points out : for a start, water vapour accumulates markedly. ‘Earth’, he continues, ‘would then heat up rapidly to a temperature near to that of boiling water.’ Notice that to achieve disaster one doesn’t in fact need 1 per cent of CO2. It is enough if the newly enhanced effect of the greehouse gases, take together, equals that of 1 percent of CO2. Scenarios with strong positive feedback are easily constructed. For instance, S.H>Scheider writes : Rapid change in climate could disrupt forests and other ecosystems reducing their ability ot draw carbon dioxide down from the atmosphere. Moreover, climatic warming could lead to rapid release of the vast amont of carbon held in the soil as dead organic matter. This stock of carbon – at least twice as much as is stored in the atmosphere – is continuously being decomposed into carbon dioxide and methane by the action of soil microbes. A warmer climate might speed their work, releasing additional carbon dioxide (From dry soils) and methane from rice paddies, landfills and wetlands) that would enhance the warming. Large quantities of methane are also locked up in the continental – shelf sediments and below arctic permafrost in the form of clathrates – molecular lattices of methane and water. Warming of shallow water of the ocean and melting of the permafrost could release some of the methane. There are over ten trillion tons of it, its carbon content thus being greater than that of all known fossil fuel desposits ; but in methane, chemical formula CH4, the carbon is considerable more threatening than in fuel burned to form CO2. Remember, methane is a greehouse gas thirty times more effective than CO2 molecule for molecule.






6. PLANKTON PRODUCE 90% OF THE PLANETS OXYGEN, A THREAT TO IT’S SURVIVAL MEANS THE PLANET LITERALLY SUFFOCATES TO DEATH.
1999 Zhan Huan Zhou, Fall 1999, Issue 4
One of the greatest examples of environmental ignorance is with the Brazilian rainforests. Perhaps the catchiest phrase and definitely the most meaningless to come out of the rainforest movement is that they are "the lungs of the earth." Yet more poppycrock! Dr. Sherwood B. Idso, a research physicist with the U.S. Water Conservation Laboratory of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Research Service, contends that the world's plant and animal life would not suffer from a lack of oxygen even if the rainforests were to be completely eliminated. This is because the main source of oxygen in the earth is the ocean, not the rainforests. Microscopic plankton in the ocean produces over 90% of the oxygen by means of photosynthesis. Instead of saving the trees, why isn't there a campaign to save the plankton?










































ADVANTAGE 3 : SEALS

1. LFA ENDANGERS SEALS
Human Society of the United States http://216.239.53.104/search?q=cache:GWgxWPD1d1gJ:files.hsus.org/web-files/PDF/LFA3_comments.pdf+LFA,+sonar,+seals&hl=en&lr=lang_zh-CN|lang_en&ie=UTF-8, 1998
This table indicates that several phocid species produce sounds and/or can hear within the frequency range of LFA sonar. Elephant seals in particular, because they are pelagic and deep – diving (and cryptic at the surface), may be most at risk form exposure to LFA sonar.


2. ALMOST ALL SPECIES OF SEALS WOULD BE DIRECTLY AFFECTED DUE TO GEOGRAPHIC PLACEMENT
[Federal Register: October 22, 1999 (Volume 64, Number 204)]
[Proposed Rules][Page 57026-57029]From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov][DOCID:fr22oc99-24] DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 50 CFR Part 216 The odontocetes (toothed whales) that may be affected because they inhabit the deeper, offshore waters where SURTASS LFA sonar might operate include both the pelagic (oceanic) whales and dolphins and those coastal species that also occur in deep water including Stenella spp., Risso's dolphin (Grampus griseus), rough-toothed dolphin (Steno bredanensis), Fraser's dolphin (Lagenodelphis hosei), right-whale dolphin (Lissodelphis spp.), Lagenorhynchus spp., Cephalorhynchus spp., bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncatus), common dolphin (Delphinus
delphis), Dall's porpoise (Phocoenoides dalli), melon-headed whale (Peponocephala spp.), beaked whales (Berardius spp., Hyperoodon spp., Mesoplodon spp., Cuvier's beaked whale (Ziphius cavirostris), Shepard's
beaked whale (Tasmacetus shepherdi), Longman's beaked whale (Indopacetus pacificus), killer whale (Orcinus orca), false killer whale (Pseudorca crassidens), pygmy killer whale (Feresa attenuata),
sperm whale (Physeter macrocephalus, Kogia spp.), and pilot whale (Globicephala spp.).
Potentially affected pinnipeds include: 8 phocid (true seal) species including, the Hawaiian and Mediterranean monk seals (Monachus spp.), harbor seals (Phoca spp), and elephant seals (Mirounga spp.); 8 species of fur seals (Arctocephalus spp., Callorhinus ursinus); and 5 species of sea lions, including the Steller sea lion (Eumetopias jubatus) and California sea lion (Zalophus californianus).

3. SEALS ARE KEY TO BIODIVERSITY
SeaWeb : Ocean Update http://www.seaweb.org/resources/12update/decline.html Nov. 1997
Declines in seals and seabirds result in reduction of biodiversity Concern has long been expressed about the direct impacts on marine wildlife species of such threats as hunting, or predation by introduced species. Now, a recent paper in Biodiversity and Conservation has underlined the serious effects for other components of coastal ecosystems when such species are removed or decline. Specifically, the paper suggests that declines in six species of coastal New Zealand plants are associated with the hunting and predation of seals and seabirds.






4. A DECLINE IN SEALS TRADES OF WITH ORCA PREDITATION, LESS SEALS MEANS OCRAS OVERPREY THE OTTER POPULATION WHICH ENDS BIODVERSITY
McGraw Hill Companies http://www.mhhe.com/biosci/pae/es_map/articles/article_28.mhtml , Feb 1999
The more complete explanation of the orcas' sudden interest in otters appears to be overfishing by humans. Orcas normally subsist on seals and sea lions, whose rich body fat is an excellent energy source for the whales. Seals, in turn, need oil-rich fish such as salmon and herring to survive in the cold northern waters, but these fish are also prized by humans, and their populations have dropped as a result of improving fishing technology and strong world markets for fish. Fish catches both near shore and off-shore have climbed steadily in recent decades, even as fish numbers have fallen. With the depletion of oil-rich fish stocks, less fatty fish, chiefly pollock, appear to have moved into the coastal waters of Alaska, but pollock apparently provide a meagre food source for seals and sea lions. Their numbers have dropped precipitously in recent years. In the absence of enough seals and sea lions, ecologists believe, orcas have found that sea otters, which can be about 4 feet long and weigh as much as 50 pounds, make good prey.
But sea otters play an important role in their ecological community. They subsist principally on sea urchins, which live on the sea floor and graze on kelp. Kelp is a large vine-like algae that grows to great heights, in kelp "forests" that shelter a complex ecosystem of fish, sea lions, sea birds, and of course the otters themselves. When otter numbers fall, sea urchin populations explode, and their grazing can destroy the kelp forest on which so many species depend. Marine biologists worry that orcas' new appetite for otters will lead to the dissolution of the complex ecological system that supports a wide range of marine mammals, fish, and birds.































ADVANTAGE 4 : FISH

1. FISH POPULATOINS AR E DECREASING NOW MORE THEN EVER THE SUSTAINABILITY OF THE FISHING INDUSTRY IS IN DANGER
Jim Lehrer, News Anchor, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/july-dec01/fishing.html, August 15, 2002

People around the world eat more fish than any other type of animal protein. Fish have been around for over 400 million years, and never before has their existence been threatened as much as it is today.Soon, you may not be able to get your favorite fish at restaurants or supermarkets, and fish are becoming more expensive than ever before. Why? There are too many fishermen in the world, and not enough fish.


2. LFA SONAR IS A DANGER TO ANY MARINE FISH SPECIFICALLY GAME FISH LIKE SALMON.

James R. Chambers, Principal Chambers and Associates http://www.chambers-associates.org/Big-Marine-Fish/sonar_notice.html, 20002

The U.S. Navy has developed an extremely powerful (low frequency) sonar to detect "quiet" submarines, and it has applied for a permit from the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to deploy it. However, based on newly available scientific information, we know that this low frequency sonar emits a shock wave that at 150 to 160 decibels can kill whales, other marine mammals and marine fish by rupturing the membranes surrounding their lungs, swim bladder, brain and auditory air spaces. The second lethal effect of the shock wave involves the activation of supersaturated gas in marine animals' blood and in their cells to form small bubbles which, like the "bends" can block the flow of blood to the brain (causing stroke) and can rupture the cell walls. This effect will be greatest in deep-diving animals (such as bluefin tuna, swordfish, bigeye tuna and deep-diving whales) that will have the highest levels of supersaturated gasses in their blood and cells. The source level of this sonar is 240 decibels (equivalent to the intensity of a Saturn rocket). But, because low frequency underwater sound can travel hundreds of miles with little loss of power, it will actually create a "kill zone" several hundred miles in diameter. NATO naval exercises using low frequency sonar conducted off Greece in 1996 killed whales that were more than 100 km away. In the final EIS for its sonar system, the Navy admits that an intensity of 160 decibels (a lethal level) will be felt several hundred miles away from the source. This will create a "Kill Zone" the size of Texas. The Navy says it wants to deploy this sonar in 80% of the world's oceans (omitting only the Arctic and Antarctic). It has already been, or is to be used in many areas that are prime habitat of marlin, swordfish, salmon, bluefin tuna, mako sharks, bigeye tuna, sailfish, spearfish, wahoo, yellowfin tuna and many other premiere game fish (and their prey species).










3. AS A VITAL KEYSTONE, SALMON POPULATIONS ARE CRITICAL TO THE HEALTH OF ENTIRE ENVIRONMENT – SPECES DEPLETION RISKS A OTAL ECOSYSTEM COLLAPSE
Ed Hunt, Environment News Service, July 6, 200 pg. Onling (“Ecosystem Keyston : Salmon Support 137 Other Species” http://www.blufish.org/keyson.html)

OLYMPIA, Washington,(ENS) -More than 137 species of fish and wildlife - from orcas to caddisflies - depend on the Northwest salmon for their survival, a revel ation that makes salmon recovery efforts of far greater importance than the protection of a single species. A new report released by Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife has found that salmon play a vital role in watershed health, transporting nutrients from the ocean back to the watershed. The discovery could spark major changes in fishery and hatchery management and the direction of salmon recovery efforts in the future. "It's not just salmon, it's the ecosystem," said Jeff Cederholm, a salmon research scientist with Washington Department of Natural Resources, principal author of the report. "We need to start giving out the whole story of what made the ecosystem; it's an abundance of fish on the spawning grounds." Orcas, also known as killer whales, rely on salmon for their food Northwest species now struggling because of depleted salmon runs include the bald eagle, grizzly bear, black bear, osprey, harlequin duck, Caspian tern and river otter. "They are all so closely tuned with the pacific salmon that many of these populations are in decline, partially due to declining food supply," Cederholm said. The report, "Pacific Salmon and Wildlife," is a collaboration of a number of organizations through Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife and Department of Natural Resources. It brings together 500 scientific studies and decades of research to document the vital role salmon play in the overall health of ecosystems. Pacific salmon are unique in that they die after they reproduce. When salmon return from the ocean, they bring vital nutrients with them to the watersheds where they were hatched. Through their decomposing carcasses, the salmon spawning process offers a vital source of food not just for salmon and other fish species, but for a whole host of organisms in the watershed.
Prior research has documented that salmon rely on the decomposing salmon carcasses as a major food source. National Marine Fisheries Service biologist Robert Bilby found that 40 to 60 percent of the stomach contents of young salmon and steelhead could be traced to salmon carcasses. When salmon carcasses were placed in streams, the density of young coho salmon in those streams increased compared to other sites. The weight and amount of fat found in the coho increased wherever the carcasses were put in the river. The healthier and better fed salmon are before they leave their home watershed, the better chance they have of returning to spawn. Earlier this year, researchers calculated that due to declining salmon runs, just five to seven percent of the nutrients originally delivered by salmon to streams is now available. The streams are starving from lack of salmon, and that lack of salmon is hurting the ability of the next generation of salmon to survive. Cederholm, who has been studying the link between salmon nutrients and ecosystem health for more than a decade, said he thinks the salmon life cycle evolved as a "primitive form of childcare." By going out into the ocean, feeding and storing nutrients, then returning to their stream of origin to spawn and die enriches the habitat, giving the young salmon a better chance for survival. "They achieved total ecosystem enrichment," Cederholm says. "Salmon really are a keystone species. ... For example, the reestablishment of the grizzly bear may be impeded by not having the primary food source it evolved with. The abundance of all these things is interrelated." Of the 137 species documented as dependent on salmon, 41 are mammals including orcas, bears and river otters, 89 are birds, including bald eagles, Caspian terns and grebes, five are reptiles and two are amphibians. "Production is based on food and space and you must have both," Cederholm said. "Pacific salmon are the food base for much of what lives in the watershed."
Bald eagles depend on salmon for food When the salmon disappear, their importance becomes evident. Cederholm points to the example of McDonald Creek in Glacier National Park. In 1981, more than 600 bald eagles gathered to feed on kokanee salmon carcasses. When an non-native shrimp was introduced in an adjacent lake, the shrimp competed with the salmon for an important food source - zooplankton - and the salmon run failed. By 1989, only 25 eagles were found at McDonald Creek. The loss of salmon caused what Cederholm calls an "ecosystem collapse." "We think we see one little change," said Cederholm. "But behind it, it's the whole ecosystem." The Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife has been placing hatchery salmon carcasses in streams to try and restore some of the lost nutrients. Andy Appleby, aquaculture coordinator for the hatchery division of Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife said the state distributed 120,000 carcasses in 23 watersheds last year as part of the state's nutrient enhancement program. Now entering its fifth year, the nutrient enhancement program has doubled every year, Appleby said, and there are plans to continue expanding the program. Oregon also has a smaller, but growing carcass distribution program. Cederholm says the nutrient enhancement program is a good stopgap measure to get much needed nutrients back into the streams, but it is a far cry from what is needed to restore streams to their historically nutrient rich state. Historically, salmon carcasses likely totaled three to five tons, for every kilometer of stream every year, Cederholm said. "Anything that gets marine derived nutrients on the spawning ground must happen right now to give wild fish a boost." Cederholm thinks change must occur in how salmon harvesting is managed.Todays salmon harvests are based on a system called Maximum Sustained Yield under which the number of fish allowed to spawn is based on generating the greatest number of harvestable fish. The report says managing using this measure drastically reduces the number of fish that should be reaching the watershed to spawn, and the nutrients in the stream, creating a spiral of lost production.
New harvest strategies need to be developed that address the nutrient delivery to freshwater ecosystems, yet there is little information available on which to base these harvest levels. Sport and commerical fishing have already been cut back to return more fish to the spawning grounds. Yet, Cederholm says in the short term, drastic measures need to be taken to make sure all wild fish get to their spawning streams.
"We are very much in an emergency situation," Cederholm said. "So I have this personal view that we must stop killing these wild fish, we must stop impeding their progress to the spawning grounds. If Gresh is right, if we are returning just five percent of these nutrients to the spawning ground, we must rebuild those runs. The wild fish that are left are the nucleus to start from."


4. ANY FURTHER LOSS OF FISH POPULATION MEANS COLAPSE OF THE fishing industry INDUSTRY
Reuters News Service, http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/19006/story.htm, Dec 12, 2002

"The next effect of overfishing will be the collapse of fish stocks and the end of the fishing industry," Cripps said. "Tens of thousands of European fishermen have already lost their jobs as fishing becomes increasingly unviable. It will only get worse if stocks are fished to commercial extinction," he said. "The future of the fishing industry depends on there being fish to catch."



5. FISHING INDUSTRY PROVIDES BILLIONS DOLLARS AND THOUSANDS OF JOBS TO THE US ECONOMY
Institute for Fisheries Resources, ww.pcffa.org 2/22 /03
PCFFA is involved and fighting for fishermen everywhere on a wide variety IUof regional and national habitat protection issues. More than 75% of this nation's entire $152 billion/year fishing industry depends upon the health of this nation's inshore or nearshore environment. These are the nursery grounds for the vast majority of all the species of fish and shellfish caught in US waters. Without clean water, healthy watersheds, biologically productive estuaries and wetlands, and unpolluted oceans, most of this nation's fishing jobs would utterly disappear!
As it is, habitat losses to date already cost our industry an estimated $27 billion/year -- enough to support 450,000 family wage jobs. The west coast salmon fishing industry (including both commercial and recreational components) has already lost an estimated 72,000 salmon-produced family wage jobs over the last 20 years. These losses are directly related to widespread inland habitat destruction and mismanagement of federal hydropower and irrigation dams. According to the American Fisheries Society, more than 106 major salmon runs in northern California and the Pacific Northwest are already extinct and another 214 are at risk of extinction in the near future. Current estimates are that unless northern California and Northwest land use practices change substantially, that eventually Pacific salmon will all but disappear from the lower 48 states -- just like Atlantic salmon have already disappeared from the east coast.
Commercial fishermen therefore must fight to protect wetlands, estuaries, old-growth salmon-producing forests and healthy river ecosystems. We must fight for abundant clean water and pristine oceans. As commercial fishermen, we must always fight for our right to exist. If we do not, our industry will be gradually strangled to death and snuffed out, for if we do not speak for the fish -- who will?
As the largest representative of west coast commercial fishermen, PCFFA has never been shy about taking on these problems. We lead the charge to put a stop to west coast oil drilling in prime fishing grounds. We were key players in passing major water reform legislation for the Central Valley Project (the "Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992"). PCFFA played a key role in improving private land forestry and grazing practices in both California and Oregon, and on all west coast federal lands. We are fighting in Congress almost daily for better fisheries habitat protection all across this nation and in every coastal state.
PCFFA's habitat protection program is now expanding and being carried on by its sister organization, the Institute for Fisheries Resources. Please jump to IFR's Home Page for more information on our efforts on behalf of the men and women of the commercial fishing fleet to protect fish habitat throughout the country.





6. CONTINUED GROWTH IS KEY TO CONTINUED ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Bjorn Lomborg, director of Denmark's national Environmental Assessment Institute and associate professor of statistics in the Department of Politital Science at the University of Aarhus, 2001, The Skeptical Environmentalist, p. 32-33.
In general we need to confront our myth of the economy undercutting the environment. We have grown to believe that we are faced with an inescapable choice between higher economic welfare and a greener environment. But surprisingly and as will be documented throughout this book, environmental development often stems from economic development - only when we get sufficiently rich can we afford the relative luxury of caring about the environment. On its most general level, this conclusion is evident in Figure 9, where higher income in general is correlated with higher environmental sustainability.



PLANS

( ___ ) THUS WE PRESENT THE FOLLOWING PLAN, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD ISSUE AN EXECUTIVE ORDER BANNING THE USE OF LOW FREQUENCY ACTIVE SONAR BY UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES.

( ____) THUS WE PRESENT THE FOLLOWING PLAN, THE UNITED STATUS SUPREME COURT SHOULD RULE UNDER THE MARINE MAMMALS PROTECTION ACT THAT LOW FREQUENCY ACTIVE SONAR IS ILLEGAL AND BAN ALL USE.


(____ )THUS WE PRESENT THE FOLLOWING PLAN, THE UNDERSECRETARY OF THE NAVY SHOULD ISSUE AN ORDER TO END ALL CURRENT AND FUTURE USE OF LOW FREQUENCY ACTIVE SONAR.

CONTENTION 3 : SOLVENCY

1. THE THREAT OF ‘SILENT SUBS’ IS CONSTRUCTED SUB TECHNOLOGY HAS DEGRADED AND EVEN THE NAVY ADMITS IT.
Stephanie Siegel, http://www.cnn.com/NATURE/9907/02/sea.noise.part3/index.html, July 2, 1999, “Does the Navy Need LFAS?”
A U.S. district judge in Hawaii, dismissing environmentalists' request to stop LFAS testing last year, said the Navy needs to develop its future antisubmarine technology.
Not everyone agrees that there is such a need or that LFAS is the way to go. A contractor warned in a trade magazine article that active sonar would reveal its source, drawing enemy fire.
U.S. Sen. Russell D. Feingold, arguing in January in Congress against a different low-frequency Navy system, ELF, said no enemy submarines threaten the United States. "The submarine capabilities of our potential adversaries have noticeably deteriorated or remain far behind those of our Navy."
The Navy doesn't claim the United States is under threat of a sub attack. The EIS team LFAS Web site shows shipping channels around the world where submarines "could be used in the future to disrupt peace and stability by interrupting transportation and commerce, thus impacting the world economy."



2. LFAS IS OBSOLETE , AND MORE THAN UNLESS IN THE CURRENT TECHNOLGOCAL CLIMATE
http://csiwhalesalive.org/csi01104.html Whales Alive! - Vol. X No. 1 - January 2001
Meanwhile scuttlebutt has increasing numbers of Navy people declaring the LFA already obsolete, with the Navy creating a new class of submarines equipped with passive arrays that would do the job of the LFA, but without telltale noise, and a class of destroyer with an LFA derivative. The latter would multiply the noise problem several times. Other nations are developing LFA clones, and most importantly, the countermeasures to deter LFA effectiveness. We are left with a noisy boondoggle pushed by a contractor, a story similar to so many wasteful military programs.

















3. THE NAVY HAS OVER 10 ENVIRONMENTALLY FRIENDLY ALTERNATIVE SONARS THAT ARE IN USE OR IN DEVELOPMENT THAT COULD REPLACE LFAS
Prepared for the Ocean Mammal Institute by Robert W. Rand, INCE Contact Marsha L. Green, PhD, at mgreen@alb.edu or Ocean Mammal Institute at www.oceanmammalinst.org 2002
Safe Alternatives to Active Sonar That Are In Use or Development by the US Navy Now 1. Passive Sonar In warfare, passive sonar has the advantage of not betraying the presence of the listener. • IUSS (Integrated Undersea Surveillance System) –FSS (Fixed Surveillance System). –FDS (Fixed Distributed System). –ADS (Advanced Deployable System). These are passive sensor systems, either stationary or dropped quickly in tactical locations, with real-time digital data links into military command/control networks. • Multi-Line Array Systems –SURTASS Twin-Line: Twin towed array lines resolving contact direction and –improving resolution. “Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) Twin Line operations in 1998 and 1999 demonstrated the ability to detect advanced diesel submarines at substantial ranges in the littoral environment where contact was previously thought to be ‘unobtainable’ by the operational commander.” —Statement of RADM Malcom I Fages, US Navy Director, Submarine Warfare Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and RADM JP Davis, US Navy Program Executive Office for Submarines, before the House Armed Services Committee Military Procurement Subcommittee on Submarine Force Structure and Modernization 27 June 2000. –VLA (Vertical Line Arrays): Stationary multiple array lines achieving significant –gains in resolution and signal-to-noise. –TB-29 submarine-towed (twin, triple): Multiple towed lines at depth resolve contact –solutions dynamically. –Sonobuoy Arrays in real-time radio linked networks. • RPS (Robust Passive Sonar) • DARPA-funded program achieving increased sonar performance by a factor of 10 using: –Multiple sensor arrays. –Advanced Signal Processing –AMFP (Adaptive Match Field Processing): Santa Barbara Channel Experiment, –year 2000. –RR-AMFP: Rank Reduction Processing improves AMFP signal-to-noise ratios an –order of magnitude. • A-RCI and other Advanced Signal Processing • Increased sonar systems processing power using: –COTS (commercial-off-the-shelf) Hardware components. –Advanced Signal Processing Software components. 2. Non-acoustic Sensors • Magnetic: Silently detects temporal magnetic anomalies such as submarine hulls. • Limited range. • Satellite imaging: Satellite imaging analysis reveals submarine trails and water • disturbances. Limited use. 3. Integrated Sensory Networks • Advanced correlative processing of complementary sensor systems. • GCI: Geologic Clutter Initiative: digitally characterize the littoral landscape • to improve sonar operations.




















4. NAVAL DEMANDS FOR LFAS ARE FLAWED, BIASED, AND INNACURATE – 5 REASONS
Lannny Sinkin, Taking Marine Mammals Incidental to Navy Operations of Survellance Towed Array Sensor System, May 31, 2001 pg. Online. (http://manyrooms.com/commentslanny.htm)
There are at least five concerns regarding the adequacy and objectivity of the research relied upon by the Navy to support deployment of SURTASS LFA.
The first is the large data gaps that exist. On the issue of auditory responses of marine mammals and other marine life to LFA or any other sound, there are essentially more gaps than data. See e.g. SACLANTCEN Bioacoustics Panel, La Spezia, Italy, 15-17 June 1998 at 2-66, 67.
Second, the Navy attempts to replace a larger body of research with the very limited research conducted by the Low Frequency Sonar Scientific Research Program (LFS SRP). See e.g. OEIS/EIS at 4.2-2, 4.2-25.
Third, the conditions in the ocean are undergoing significant, and even radical, change. The Earth’s environment is under extraordinary stress from human activity. The oceans are no exception. Fisheries are collapsing from excessive harvesting. Ecosystems are collapsing from pollution. Global warming is changing the oceans and threatening the food chain. None of these stresses are considered in the EIS for deployment of SURTASS LFA. To the contrary, the absence of any consideration implicitly implies that the oceans are as vital and healthy as they have been in the not too distant past. Assuming a steady state condition, rather than an increasingly stressed condition, for the ocean environment fails to provide a comprehensive context for environmental analysis.
There is also the environmental damage being inflicted on land by overpopulation and other factors. As the impacts of environmental degradation increase on land, those impacts can be expected to spill over into the oceans. "At Mayor Jeremy Harris’ second Mayor’s Asia-Pacific Environmental Summit yesterday, one leader after another confessed to struggling to reverse environmental collapse." Environmental concerns span Asia-Pacific region, Honolulu Advertiser, May 5, 2001 at p. B1.
Fourth, the Navy has a vested interest in supplanting research that does not support deployment because the Navy invested more than $350 million in preparing to deploy SURTASS LFA. As a United States Senator observed: "[T]he U.S. Navy has spent more than $300 million to develop [SURTASS LFA] since 1989. So this is far more than a casual interest to the U.S. Navy." Letter dated May 7, 2001 from Senator Daniel Inouye to Mr. Lanny Sinkin.
Fifth, much of the available funding to conduct research in this area comes from the Navy, calling into question the independence of researchers seeking such funding. "The increasing reliance of the U.S. marine mammal research community on U.S. Navy funding appears to be effectively restricting academic freedom." Marine Mammal Science, the U.S. Navy, and Academic Freedom by Hal Whitehead and Linda Weilgart, Marine Mammal Science, 11(2):260-263 (April 1995) at 260.

- Mike, 7:22 PM

 
//
// Stationery for AP classes
// 031398 -- RGrehan, Metrowerks, Inc.

// Includes
#include "apvector.h"
#include "apqueue.h"
#include "apstack.h"
#include "apstring.h"
#include "apmatrix.h"

// Define objects
apvector intVector; // Integer vector
apqueue intQueue; // Integer queue
apstack intStack; // Integer stack
apstring myString; // String
apmatrix intMatrix(5,5,3); // Integer matrix
void Insertion (apvector, int &, int &);
void print_values (apvector);
void Selection (apvector , int &, int &);

int main()
{
apvector A(5);
A[0] = 5;
A[1] = 4;
A[2] = 3;
A[3] = 2;
A[4] = 1;

int comparison_count = 0;
int switch_count = 0;

Insertion(A, comparison_count, switch_count);

int insertion_comp_count = comparison_count;
int insertion_switch_count = switch_count;
comparison_count = 0;
switch_count = 0;

Selection(A, comparison_count, switch_count);

}

void Insertion (apvector arr, int & comparison_count, int & switch_count)
{
cout << "******* INSERTION SORT ********";
cout << endl;
cout << "THE ARRAY NOW APPEARS : ";
print_values(arr);
cout << endl;
int i, j;
int temp;
for ( i = 1; i < arr.length(); i++ )
{
temp = arr[i];
j = i;
while ( j > 0 && temp < arr[j-1] )
{
cout << temp;
cout << " is compared with ";
cout << arr[j-1];
comparison_count++;
cout << endl;
arr[j] = arr[j-1];
j--;
}
cout << arr[j];
cout << " is switched with ";
cout << temp;
cout << endl;

arr[j] = temp;
switch_count++;

}
cout << "Total Comparisons : ";
cout << comparison_count;
cout << endl;
cout << "Total Switchs : ";
cout << switch_count;
cout << endl;
cout << "THE ARRAY NOW APPEARS : ";
print_values(arr);
cout << endl;
}

void Selection(apvector a, int & comparisoncount, int & switchcount)

// Sort a[0], ..., a[size-1] in ascending order.

{
cout << endl;
cout << "SELECTION SORT : ";
cout << endl;
int i, iMax, n;
double aTemp;
int size = a.length();

for (n = size; n >= 2; n--) {
// Find the index "iMax" of the largest element
// among a[0], ..., a[n-1]:

iMax = 0;
for (i = 1; i < n -1 ; i++)
cout << a[i];
cout << " is compared with ";
cout << a[iMax];
cout << endl;
if (a[i] > a[iMax])
iMax = i;

// Swap a[iMax] with a[n-1]:
cout << a[n - 1];
cout << " is switched with ";
cout << a[iMax];
cout << endl;
aTemp = a[iMax]; // Save a[iMax] in a temporary location.
a[iMax] = a[n-1]; // Copy a[n-1] to a[iMax].
a[n-1] = aTemp; // Copy saved value to a[n-1].
//print_values(a);
//cout << endl;
// Decrement n (accomplished by n-- in the "for" loop).
}
print_values(a);
cout << endl;
switchcount = size - 1;
comparisoncount = (size / 2)*(size - 1);

cout << "Total Comparisons : ";
cout << comparisoncount;
cout << endl;

cout << "Total Switches : " ;
cout << switchcount;
cout << endl;
}




void print_values (apvector A)
{
for(int i = 0; i < A.length(); i++)
cout << A[i];
}

- Mike, 6:47 AM

 
//
// Stationery for AP classes
// 031398 -- RGrehan, Metrowerks, Inc.

// Includes
#include "apvector.h"
#include "apqueue.h"
#include "apstack.h"
#include "apstring.h"
#include "apmatrix.h"
#include "fstream.h"
// Define objects
apvector intVector; // Integer vector
apqueue intQueue; // Integer queue
apstack intStack; // Integer stack
apstring myString; // String
apmatrix intMatrix(5,5,3); // Integer matrix
//void insertionsort (apvector, int &, int &);
void changearray (/*apvector, int, int, int*/void);
void print_values (apvector);
int NUMBER = 0;
void sel_sort (apvector , int &, int &);
void BubbleSort (apvector, int &, int &);
void Insertion (apvector, int &, int&);

void shortcircuit (apvector v, int & comparisoncount, int & switchcount);

int main()
{
fstream I;
fstream J;
fstream f1;
apvector a (5);

f1.open("numbers.txt", ios :: app);



a[4] = 4;
a[3] = 3;
a[2] = 2;
a[1] = 5;
a[0] = 1;
char choice = 'n';
int switchcount = 0;
int comparisoncount = 0;
//insertionsort(a,comparisoncount,switchcount);
cout << "WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE THE INSERTION SORT? (Y/N) :";
cin >> choice;
if (choice == 'Y')
{
sel_sort(a, comparisoncount, switchcount);
int sel_switch = switchcount;
int sel_compare = comparisoncount;
switchcount = 0;
comparisoncount = 0;
}
//BubbleSort(a, comparisoncount, switchcount);
//insertionsort(a,comparisoncount,switchcount);
//int bubbleswitch = switchcount;
//int bubblescompare = comparisoncount;
//switchcount = 0;
//comparisoncount = 0;
choice = 'n';
cout << "WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE THE INSERTION SORT? (Y/N) : ";
cin >> choice;
if(choice == 'Y')
{
Insertion(a, comparisoncount, switchcount);
int insertionswitch = switchcount;
int insertioncompare = comparisoncount;
switchcount = 0;
comparisoncount = 0;
}
choice = 'n';
cout << "WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE THE BUBBLE SORT? (Y/N) : ";
cin >> choice;
if(choice == 'Y')
{
BubbleSort(a, comparisoncount, switchcount);
//insertionsort(a,comparisoncount,switchcount);
int bubbleswitch = switchcount;
int bubblescompare = comparisoncount;
switchcount = 0;
comparisoncount = 0;
}
choice = 'n';
cout << "WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE THE EFFICIENT BUBBLE SORT? (Y/N) :";
cin >> choice;
if(choice == 'Y')
{
shortcircuit(a, comparisoncount, switchcount);
}
}

void insertionsort (apvector A, int & comparisoncount, int & switchcount)
{
cout << endl;
cout << "INSERTION SORT : ";
cout << endl;
int temp;
//int switchcount = 0;
int counter2 = 0;
int counter = 0;
int i = 1;
//int comparisoncount = 0;
int len = A.length();
for(int i = 1; i <= len-1; i++)
{
//if(i == 1)
//{
//cout << " (th)(rd)(st)(nd)";
print_values(A);
cout << endl;
//}
counter++;
switchcount++;

for(int j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--)
{
if(A[i] < A[j])
{
temp = A[i];

while (i > j)
{
A[i] = A[i -1];
comparisoncount++;
changearray();
i--;

}
A[j] = temp;


}


}



}
cout << "THE NUMBER OF SWITCHES WAS : ";
cout << switchcount;
cout << endl;
cout << "THE NUMBER OF COMPARISONS WAS : ";
cout << comparisoncount;
cout << endl;
//i++;

}




void changearray (apvector A,int i,int j,int tem)
{
NUMBER++;
//while(i > j)
// A[i - 1] = A[i];
//A[j] = temp;
//print_values(A);
}

void print_values (apvector A)
{
for(int i = 0; i < A.length(); i++)
cout << A[i];
}


void sel_sort(apvector a, int & comparisoncount, int & switchcount)

// Sort a[0], ..., a[size-1] in ascending order.

{
cout << endl;
cout << "SELECTION SORT : ";
cout << endl;
int i, iMax, n;
double aTemp;
int size = a.length();

for (n = size; n >= 2; n--) {
print_values(a);
cout << endl;
// Find the index "iMax" of the largest element
// among a[0], ..., a[n-1]:

iMax = 0;
for (i = 1; i < n; i++)
if (a[i] > a[iMax])
iMax = i;

// Swap a[iMax] with a[n-1]:

aTemp = a[iMax]; // Save a[iMax] in a temporary location.
a[iMax] = a[n-1]; // Copy a[n-1] to a[iMax].
a[n-1] = aTemp; // Copy saved value to a[n-1].
//print_values(a);
//cout << endl;
// Decrement n (accomplished by n-- in the "for" loop).
}
print_values(a);
cout << endl;
switchcount = size - 1;
comparisoncount = (size / 2)*(size - 1);
cout << "THE NUMBER OF SWITCHES WAS : " ;
cout << switchcount;
cout << endl;
cout << "THE NUMBER OF COMPARISONS WAS : ";
cout << comparisoncount;
cout << endl;
}

//****************************************************************
//*********** Bubble sort **************
//****************************************************************

void BubbleSort (apvector v, int & comparisoncount, int & switchcount)
{ cout << endl;
cout << "THE BUBBLE SORT : ";
cout << endl;
int i, n = v.length(), temp;
print_values(v);
cout << endl;
while (n > 1)
{
for (i = 1; i < n; i++)
{
if (v[i - 1] > v[i]) // if left side is greater than right side
{
temp = v[i];
v[i] = v[i-1];
v[i-1] = temp;
switchcount++;
print_values(v);
cout << endl;
}
}
n--;
}
comparisoncount = (((v.length() * v.length()) - v.length()) / 2);
cout << "THE NUMBER OF COMPARISONS WAS : ";
cout << comparisoncount;
cout << endl;
cout << "THE NUMBER OF SWITCHES WAS : ";
cout << switchcount;
cout << endl;
}



void Insertion (apvector arr, int & comparisoncount, int & switchcount)
{
int i, j;
int temp;
cout << endl;
cout << "INSERTION SORT : ";
cout << endl;
print_values(arr);
cout << endl;
for ( i = 1; i < arr.length(); i++ ) {
temp = arr[i];
j = i;
comparisoncount++;
while ( j > 0 && temp < arr[j-1] ) {
arr[j] = arr[j-1];
//print_values(arr);
//cout << endl;
switchcount++;
j--;
if ( j > 0 )
comparisoncount++;
}
arr[j] = temp;
switchcount++;
print_values(arr);
cout << endl;
}
cout << "THE NUMBER OF COMPARISONS WAS : ";
cout << comparisoncount;
cout << endl;
cout << "THE NUMBER OF SWITCHES WAS : ";
cout << switchcount;
cout << endl;
}


//****************************************************************
//*********** short circuiting sort **************
//****************************************************************

void shortcircuit (apvector v, int & comparisoncount, int & switchcount)
{ cout << endl;
cout << "THE MORE EFFIECENT BUBBLE SORT : ";
cout << endl;
int i, n = v.length(), temp;
int switchcount2;
print_values(v);
cout << endl;
while (n > 1)
{
for (i = 1; i < n; i++)
{
switchcount2 = switchcount;
if (v[i - 1] > v[i]) // if left side is greater than right side
{
temp = v[i];
v[i] = v[i-1];
v[i-1] = temp;
switchcount++;
print_values(v);
cout << endl;
if(switchcount2 == switchcount)
n = 1;
}
}
n--;
}
comparisoncount = (((v.length() * v.length()) - v.length()) / 2);
cout << "THE NUMBER OF COMPARISONS WAS : ";
cout << comparisoncount;
cout << endl;
cout << "THE NUMBER OF SWITCHES WAS : ";
cout << switchcount;
cout << endl;
}

- Mike, 6:36 AM

 
//
// Stationery for AP classes
// 031398 -- RGrehan, Metrowerks, Inc.

// Includes
#include "apvector.h"
#include "apqueue.h"
#include "apstack.h"
#include "apstring.h"
#include "apmatrix.h"

// Define objects
apvector intVector; // Integer vector
apqueue intQueue; // Integer queue
apstack intStack; // Integer stack
apstring myString; // String
apmatrix intMatrix(5,5,3); // Integer matrix
int power (int, int);
int gcd (int, int);
int factorial (int);
int main()
{
//int a = 3;
//int b = 3;
//cout << power(3,3);
//cout << gcd(3,2);
cout << factorial(5);
}

int power(int x, int n)
{
if (n < 0)
{
cout << "undefined";
return(-1);
}
if (n > 0)
return ( power(x, n - 1)*x );
else
return (1);
}

int gcd(int x, int y)
{
if ( y < x)
{
int temp;
temp = x;
x = y;
y = temp;
}
int a = (y % x);
if ( a == 0)
return x;
else
{
gcd(y,a);
}
}

int factorial (int x)
{
int y;



if(x>1)


{
cout << x;
cout << "! = ";
cout << x;
cout << " x ";
cout << x -1;
cout << "!\n";
cout << "AND THE FUNCTION IS CALLED AGAIN FOR";
cout << x-1;
cout << "!";
cout << endl;
x = x - 1;
x = x * factorial(x);


}
}

- Mike, 6:34 AM

 
bush elimates teh old ligation process on tobacco
Eglund, Staff Writer, March 19, 2001 (Toby, The Gully) http://www.thegully.com/essays/US/politics_2001/010319tobacco_bush.html
A group of quixotic, anti-tobacco lawmakers introduced a bipartisan bill in the U.S. House of Representatives last week that would classify nicotine as a drug and tobacco products as drug delivery devices, and finally give the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the unquestioned authority to regulate them. Most importantly, the legislation would allow the FDA to restrict marketing, especially to youths. The legislation, which stalled last year under Clinton, is sure to fail now under George W. Bush, who has promised to abolish the "old system of mandate, regulate, and litigate."

 
republicans support tobacco education programs but not regulations
Klein, Media News General Service, Sunday, 8/6/01 (Gil, Richmon Times-Dispatch) http://www.tobaccofreedom.org/issues/specials/bush.html
Bush said he would support the federal tobacco price-support program "because it does not cost the taxpayers any money.'' He said that he is a free trader and that farm exports in general would help all farmers.On the question of smoking, he said states need to provide ample warning about the risks."I don't think we should raise the cigarette taxes at the federal level," he said. "I believe states ought to do a better job of informing children of the hazards of smoking. But we have recognized that there are some adults, once properly warned, who choose to smoke."

 
Republicans support anti-smoking programs for children but have politicla inscentive to avoid regulations
Republican National Committe, 2000, (Republican Platform) http://216.239.37.100/search?q=cache:Yx7klQMCn7QC:www.perimeter.org/html/civic_concerns/2000RepublicPlatform.pdf+%22republicans+support%22,+%22voluntary+programs%22,+tobacco&hl=en&ie=UTF-8
Children's Health.The huge strides we have already made in improving children's health must be balanced against sobering statistics. Asthma attects nearly five million children and teh incidence is dramatically increasing . Childhood obesity has jumped 100 percent in the lsat 15 years and can be a forerunner of the most serious illnesses later in life. Diabetes is now the second most common chronic disease in childre. Youth drug abuse has more than doubled in teh past eight years. Smoking rates for youth have risen alarmingly. Every year, 2,500 babies are born with fetal alcohol syndrome. So much of the suffering cuased by childhood diseases can be prevented - by increasing immunization rates; by increasing resources for biomedical research, not by crippling pharmaceutical progress; by sensible strategies agaisnt teen smoking rather than teh folly of prohibition; by a real war on drugs in place of the white flag policies of recent years. Our commitment is to address teh emotional, behavoiral, and mental illnessses affecting children. With parental involvement as teh critical component, we cna help our youth make health and teh right choice in avoding risk behaviors involving alcohol, drugs, premarital sex, tobacco, and violence

 
Republicans opposed to tobacco regulation
Ostrow, Guest Columnist, 2002 (Daniel, Daily Princetonian) http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/Content/2000/10/24/edits/304.html
First, we have the Republican stance on tobacco. For some odd reason, Republicans actually support the tobacco industry. Sure cigarettes cause lung cancer (finally an accepted fact), but that doesn't seem to bother the Republicans. Crystal clear (as opposed to fuzzy) statistics have established that lung cancer is the leading type of cancer and that cancer is the second leading cause of death among all Americans. But Republicans are still asking, "Why exactly are they harmful again?" The party continues to question why the FDA should regulate nicotine. Maybe because it kills far more Americans each year than any other dangerous substance.

But when Sen. John McCain proposed a bill that would allow the FDA to regulate nicotine as a drug, Congress went along with the Republican Party and killed it. That same year, Congress didn't approve a deal restricting tobacco industry advertising, even though it found that those companies often marketed cigarettes to minors. How can they not realize that inhaling smoke is bad for you? Haven't we all heard on the evening news, "Firefighter hospitalized for smoke inhalation?"

 
7 Weeks GHM Tradeoff DA
p. ___/___
______________________________________________

(__) We need to concentrate on combating bioterrorism
Blum, Research Professor of Health Law at Loyola University School of Law, 2002 (John D., Lawyering for a new democracy, Wisconsin Law Review, pg. Lexis-Nexis)
A great deal of legal commentary has focused on federalism in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent opinions in the area. n58 A careful examination of the current federalism opinions demonstrates that these decisions do nothing to alter Congress's ability to use the power of the purse to circumvent the states, and if an arm of the federal government is limited by the Court, it is the federal courts, not Congress, that are most directly affected. n59 The Clinton administration [*618] issued Executive Order 13,083, which dealt with federalism and bolstered federal power, but it was rescinded as a result of opposition from state governors. n60 During the George W. Bush administration, a seemingly more conciliatory approach towards the states was included as an early administration agenda item, n61 but this appears to have given way to the realities of a post-September 11th world in which Washington needs to retain considerable power, particularly in areas involving public health threats such as bioterrorism.

(__) Anthrax attack prove bioterrorism is real
Kellman, Professor of Law and Director, Spring 2002 (Barry, An International Criminal Law Approach to Bioterrorism, Wisconsin Law Review, pg. Lexis-Nexis)
Bioterrorism is a reality, and we are all threatened. n1 We need to make critical choices without delay. The recent anthrax attacks of Autumn 2001 have nullified any resort to relaxed deliberation. Because response measures, no matter how elaborate, cannot confine the spread of disease and panic within acceptable limits, our choices must focus on preventing terrorists from acquiring or developing biological weapons. n2 Thus, there is an inexorable linkage between preventing biological terrorism and controlling biological weapons.

(__) Global action against bioterrorism need
Kellman, Professor of Law and Director, Spring 2002 (Barry, An International Criminal Law Approach to Bioterrorism, Wisconsin Law Review, pg. Lexis-Nexis)
The ease with which pathogens can be carried or shipped means that unilateral action cannot prevent bioterrorism. Investigators may uncover a secret laboratory in the United States, but a laboratory in most other parts of the world could easily escape detection, and operations could proceed with minimal risk. Robust domestic regulatory and law enforcement capabilities alone would have negligible ability to detect foreign terrorists who are developing biological agents nor to prevent someone from bringing weaponized agents to the United States.

In view of the potential magnitude of casualties, n8 it makes sense to consider ways of reducing the risk that weapons quality biological agents from a foreign source will be used against the United States. n9 Successful measures to combat bioterrorism should include attempts to identify covert biological weapons activities and to interdict those activities as well as transnational [*724] movements of deadly pathogens. The current capabilities to detect or interdict pathogens are worse than inadequate; these capabilities are virtually non-existent.


(__) Understanding bioterrorism and using funds to combat it is needed
Blum, Research Professor of Health Law at Loyola University School of Law, 2002 (John D., Lawyering for a new democracy, Wisconsin Law Review, pg. Lexis-Nexis)
A strategy for combating bioterrorism must be grounded in an understanding of the realities of biological weapons. During the last decade, if not before, at least two conditions have become strikingly evident, and these realities are decisive in determining the appropriateness of alternative control measures.

First, the deliberate spread of plague or ebola now has little military utility for states with sufficient technology to prepare such weapons. Although state military programs have developed biological weapons and can do so again, the implications of devastating retaliation against such activity provide a significant safeguard. Acquisition of biological weapons by non-state terrorists, however, is a rapidly growing concern because deterrence is less effective in dealing with terrorists. Biological weapons are devastatingly effective against civilian populations, whether against one's own subjects or foreigners. Moreover, biological weapons are uniquely effective at spreading panic, which is often a prime terrorist objective. n33 Biological weapons can also be inflicted discreetly, enabling terrorists to flee after an attack, but before law enforcement personnel are on full alert. The important point here is that disarmament and non-proliferation measures are likely to be inapposite for addressing biological weapons threats--a control strategy that does not [*729] focus on terrorist acquisition and use of biological weapons is wrongly directed.

Second, capabilities for producing biological weapons are ubiquitous, but capabilities for verifying their non-production are illusory. Any reasonably-equipped biological research laboratory or bio-pharmaceutical facility has the capacity to make biological weapons quickly and, just as quickly, to eliminate any trace of that activity. n34 In view of the large number of these facilities, deciding what to look for and where to examine is tantamount to guessing. n35 Even if a robust inspection scheme could be conceived, it could be easily circumvented. Moreover, while weaponizing biological agents is far from a trivial undertaking, it is not so difficult that terrorists, much less a state, would be compelled to employ observable bio-pharmaceutical facilities. On the contrary, biological weapons can and would likely be made in covert facilities unrelated to any declared sites, especially if legitimate bio-pharmaceutical enterprises are subject to international monitoring. Even the most effective and lowest-cost verification system directed at the legitimate bio-pharmaceutical sector would not likely detect, prevent, or reduce the risk of bioterrorism to any substantial degree.

Combined, these realities of biological weapons signify that the Protocol is the right answer to the wrong problem. It propounds a reasonably balanced scheme to verify the unverifiable, while being significantly inattentive to dangerous behavior pursued covertly by non-state terrorism. n36 There is no point in arguing, therefore, whether the proposed BWC Protocol is more or less effective, burdensome, or intrusive than alternative verification tactics. Once we understand that the inherent nature of the problem does not lend itself to an arms control approach, then the important discussion must focus on alternative approaches.

 
http://www.terrorismlibrary.com/bioterrorism.htm

 
Source: Foreign Affairs, Jan-Feb 2001 v80 i1 p76.

Title: The Nightmare of Bioterrorism.
Author: Laurie Garrett

Full Text COPYRIGHT 2001 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

TOOLS IN HAND

As the twenty-first century begins, the following nations possess biological weapons: Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, China, North Korea, Russia, Israel, Taiwan, and possibly Sudan, India, Pakistan, and Kazakhstan. The list cuts across lines of ideology, politics, and geography. In addition, according to intelligence sources in Europe and the United States, militant political groups across the globe are now developing or seeking to purchase biological weapons for terrorist use.

Meanwhile, the sophistication of biological weaponry has improved by leaps and bounds. Until 1985, all of the world's biological-weapons makers were stuck with the same list of pathogens and toxins that could kill thousands of enemies and be delivered with missiles or large-scale aerosol systems. Each nation knew the list and stocked antidotes and vaccines. It was a standoff.

But biology in the last decade has been what physics was in the 1940s and 1950s: a field of exponential discovery. What seemed impossible in 1980 was accomplished by 1990 and, by 2000, had become ho-hum fodder for high school biology classes. By the late 1990s, a massive pool of bioengineers, equipped with genetic blueprints to guide their efforts, had emerged. Determining the genetic sequence of a virus, such as Ebola, was no longer much of a feat. In 1998, scientists at the Frederick Cancer Research Center in Maryland determined, at the genetic level, exactly how anthrax kills human cells.

In response to such advances, Western militaries hardened their defenses against biological warfare as they vaccinated troops, stockpiled antitoxins, stored appropriate antibiotics, purchased protective suits and masks, practiced war-game drills involving biological weapons, and supported research on potential microbe- detecting devices. But no one had a master plan for dealing with the collateral impact of biological weapons on civilians located around the combat zone -- or the deliberate impact of bioterrorist damage inflicted on an unsuspecting community. Were a terrorist to disperse the smallpox virus, for example, populations that were once universally vaccinated would now be horribly vulnerable. Today the U.S. government stows only about 15.4 million doses of the smallpox vaccine -- enough for less than seven percent of the American population. The World Health Organization (WHO) keeps another 500,000 doses in the Netherlands, and other national stockpiles total about 60 million more doses of varying quality and potency. If the smallpox virus were released today, the majority of the world's population would be defenseless, and given the virus' 30 percent kill rate, nearly two billion people could die.

The picture worsened in 1999, when scientists discovered that the U.S. samples of the smallpox vaccine had severely deteriorated. Originally made in the 1970s by the Wyeth pharmaceutical company, the samples were stored at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta in the form of freeze-dried crystals parceled out in 100-dose quantities inside vacuum-sealed glass tubes. The tubes were further sealed with rubber stoppers secured by metal clamps. To their dismay, CDC investigators discovered condensation in many of the glass tubes, indicating that the rubber stoppers had decayed and vacuum pressure had been lost. Such vaccine supplies can no longer be considered safe for human use. Although the rest of the world's vaccine reserves have not undergone similar scrutiny, experts do not have much confidence in those either. Furthermore, the world's supplies of bifurcated needles - - uniquely designed for scratch-administering the smallpox vaccine on human skin -- have been depleted, and companies are no longer interested in manufacturing such specialized devices.

The world is thus completely vulnerable to a smallpox attack. The last time a mass emergency vaccination took place in the United States was 1947, when a traveler from Mexico spread smallpox to New York City. Vaccines were then readily available, and 6.35 million New Yorkers were immunized in less than four weeks. In 1961, a similar vaccination campaign was administered following a smallpox outbreak in England: 5.5 million people were immunized in a month's time. A decade later, smallpox cases in Yugoslavia prompted the rapid vaccination of 20 million people in that country. Were a smallpox crisis to emerge today, none of these efforts could be repeated.

LETHAL LAG TIME

Even if large stockpiles of the smallpox vaccine could be collected immediately, they would be of limited value for two reasons: only several days after infection would individuals develop recognizable symptoms, by which time thousands -- even millions -- would have been exposed; and only several days or weeks after vaccination would individuals develop sufficient antibodies to stave off infection.

For other diseases preventable by vaccine, such as anthrax, the lag time between inoculation and the development of powerful antibodies could be far longer -- up to a year, even with boosters. And of course, immunization efforts would be useless against vaccine-resistant pathogens, such as those created by Soviet scientists working on anthrax weapons. Furthermore, a determined bioterrorist could simply try a succession of microbial weapons -- or use a cocktail at the outset -- defying even the best-organized vaccination programs.

The cost of a delayed response to an anthrax attack would be staggering, explains CDC economist Martin Meltzer: in a model city of 100,000 people, the number of "deaths is 5,000 if you start [a vaccination program] on day one [after the attack], versus 35,000 on day six." Cities large and small, then, should start stockpiling relevant antibiotics, vaccines, and general medical supplies.

But even if cities were well equipped for a bioterrorist attack, they would still have a difficult time recognizing that such an attack had occurred. Local authorities "probably aren't going to be able to recognize it has happened ... until the incubation period is over," says Clark Staten, executive director of the Emergency Response and Research Institute in Chicago. "And by then, you've got it spread over a wide area. And it may take longer to recognize there's a pattern going on."

Once an outbreak is recognized, an epidemiologist would be dispatched to identify the cause. If the pathogen were fairly common, like Clostridium botulinum (the bacterium that causes botulism, a fatal food poisoning), local hospital laboratories could probably identify the culprit first. But if the microbe were rare, like those that cause anthrax, Q fever, Ebola, smallpox, or plague, local facilities would probably be unable to diagnose the problem. With precious time passing, people dying, and disease possibly spreading, local officials would then await word from the diagnostic labs at the CDC. If the suspected pathogen were highly deadly, like the smallpox virus, the analysis would be handled in the CDC's Special Pathogens laboratory, which is normally staffed by fewer than a dozen highly specialized scientists. And during a crisis, it would be difficult to find qualified supplementary staff to scale up operations. During the 1995 Ebola outbreak in Zaire, forexample, the lab was staffed by a mere six scientists WHO toiled around the clock trying to identify the presence of the lethal virus in some 30,000 tissue, blood, plant, insect, and animal samples. In the case of a bioterrorist attack, valuable time -- and lives -- might be lost during such an arduous process.

In a large urban center, the true costs of a bioterrorist attack might be the consequences of panic, such as a stock market collapse in New York or a commodities market crash in Chicago. At a 1998 Senate hearing on bioterrorism, then Minnesota State Epidemiologist Michael Osterholm warned against underestimating the degree of panic such an event would provoke:

[A] single case of meningitis in a local high school causes enough fear and panic to bring down a whole community. ... Now imagine you're telling people, "This is going to unfold for eight weeks, and I can't tell you if you're going to die." And with every symptom ... real or imagined, [people are] going to think, "I've got it! I'm going to die!"

A TELLING SCENARIO

In February 1999, the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Defense Studies enacted an elaborate bioterrorist scenario in Crystal City, Virginia. The details played out over a tense eight-hour period in a room packed with public health, military, and law enforcement personnel. Under the scenario, the vice president of the United States makes a speech at a prestigious university located in a fictional town dubbed Northeast. It's April 1. Eleven days later, a 20-year-old student who attended the vice president's speech shows up in the university hospital's emergency room with flu-like symptoms: high fever, muscle aches, fatigue, headache. She is sent home with aspirin and the old maxim: get some rest and drink plenty of fluids.

Two days later, the young woman returns to the hospital, now fighting for her life. And a janitor who cleaned up after the vice president's speech turns up with the same symptoms. By six o'clock that night, April 13, the hospital's infectious disease expert gingerly voices an outrageous conclusion: both patients have smallpox.

Since smallpox was officially eradicated in 1977, and remaining samples of the virus exist only in Atlanta and Siberia under lock and key, there can be but one conclusion: someone has stolen laboratory samples of the virus and deliberately released them in a bioterrorist attack aimed at the vice president of the United States.

Under this scenario, more than 15,000 people die of smallpox worldwide within two months, and epidemics rage out of control in 14 nations. All global supplies of the smallpox vaccine are depleted, and it will take years to manufacture enough to save humanity. The global economy teeters on the brink of collapse as nations close their borders and sink into isolation, barring all Americans from entering their countries. In the city of Northeast, utter chaos reigns, and the National Guard enforces martial law over the city's two million residents. Similarly, government authority either breaks down or reverts to military-style control in cities all over the world as smallpox claims lives and pits terrified citizens against one another. Meanwhile, back in Northeast, a top smallpox expert scribbles projections on the back of an envelope and gently slides it in front of the state governor: within 12 months 80 million people worldwide will be dead.

"We blew it," declared California's top public health scientist, Michael Ascher, commenting on the fictional scenario. "It clearly got out of control. Whatever planning we had ... didn't work. I think this is the harsh reality [of] what would happen."

BUDDING BIOTERRORISTS

Although most people remain ignorant of the issues raised in that scenario, handfuls of Internet-hooked extremists, right-wing militia members, psychologically imbalanced belligerents, and postmodern fascists are well versed in the fine points of bioterrorism. Recipes for producing botulinum and anthrax are posted on the Web. Books describing biological-warfare assassination techniques are readily available. Some private militia groups train to use biological weapons.

Indeed, law enforcement leaders claim that religious cults and militant political groups are likely to engage in biological terrorism. After all, they argue, the first bioterrorist attack in America was carried out by members of an Oregon-based religious cult led by Bagwan Shree Rajneesh. The cult members, hoping to disrupt an upcoming county election, contaminated local salad bars with salmonella, infecting hundreds of Oregonians.

Perhaps it is the tone of some militants' rhetoric that sparks the most concern. In The Poisoner's Handbook, for example, Maxwell Hutchkinson suggests that readers poison or kill Internal Revenue Service workers by filling out phony tax-return forms and lacing them with a mixture of ricin (a poisonous protein) and dimethylsulfoxide (DMSO) -- a concoction Hutchkinson claims is 100 percent lethal. "The purpose of all this is to disrupt the operations" of the IRS, Hutchkinson writes. "If done on a large enough scale, it would serve two purposes -- it would make it more difficult for the IRS to operate efficiently, thus helping tax cheats and tax protesters. It might also awaken the politicians to the depth of resentment felt by the taxpaying public."

Fortunately, Hutchkinson is a lousy chemist: only simple chemicals -- not proteins such as ricin -- can dissolve in DMSO. But the depth of Hutchkinson's antagonism is unmistakable: he suggests that readers kill Catholics by soaking their rosary beads in Phytotoxin abrin, a toxin derived from a rare bean; he writes that botulinum is "fun and easy to make"; and he urges survivalists around the world to hone their skills, readying themselves for biological warfare in the coming Armageddon.

RAISING THE BAR

In response to such threats, Congress has passed a number of laws aimed at making it harder for anyone -- domestic or foreign -- to attack America with biological weapons. In 1989, Congress passed the Biological Weapons Act, outlawing the possession, trade, sale, or manufacture of a biological substance "for use as a weapon." In 1991, it enacted an embargo, soon enforced against Iraq, barring U.S. companies from trading with countries believed to be developing biological weapons. After the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1996, allowing federal authorities to arrest anyone WHO even "threatens" to develop or use biological weapons. And the following year, by order of Congress, the CDC named 24 infectious organisms and 12 toxins as "restricted agents," the use or possession of which requires a federal permit. Although these measures now provide legal instruments for federal law enforcement officials, it is impossible to judge how effectively they have, or have not, deterred biological terrorism.

The Clinton administration hoped to stave off the worst threats by training the National Guard and local hazardous-material defense teams to rapidly respond to bioterrorist attacks. But the teams, comprising elite local police squads and fire department personnel, handled chemical and biological threats as if they were roughly synonymous -- a fatal mistake, according to biologists. Having been trained in classical techniques for limiting the spread of lethal chemicals, the defense teams assumed that a visible source of contamination could be identified, that exposed individuals could be isolated, and that a toxin could be swiftly cleared out of the environment with water or neutralizing chemicals. None of these assumptions holds true for lethal microbes, biologists argue, because their long incubation periods in potentially contagious human beings render it nearly impossible to identify and contain a source. Furthermore, "washing" an area contaminated with pathogens might only spread them.

Congress has sought technological solutions as well, allocating money for Department of Defense (DOD) research on devices that might sniff out bugs and sanitize contaminated areas. First in line was the Navy's TagMan, a sophisticated gene scanner that could, in less than half an hour, determine whether a liquid sample contained any of several known pathogens. But the system had significant limitations: weighing 300 pounds, it was hardly portable. And it could not detect pathogens of high "biohazard levels" -- precisely the most worrisome microbes. Most significant, the device could not analyze air samples.

In 1998, Congress also gave the DOD's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) $2 billion to sponsor wild and crazy science projects -- ideas so far-out that standard civilian funding sources would not consider them. These projects included $61.6 million of bioweapons defense efforts, the foremost of which was the development of a fast, cheap, safe, and portable way to sample air for the presence of nasty pathogens. Most of the research focused on unique genetic attributes of bacteria and viruses.

One project involved trying to grow human nerve cells on microscopic chips that would change color or light up if they detected a neurotoxin, such as botulinum. Several laboratories -- notably the Argonne National Laboratory in Chicago -- tried to develop chips lined with thousands of pieces of bacterial DNA to serve as probes. Argonne's goal was to build a bacteria detector small enough to be handheld, akin to a police radar gun. But research director Eli Huberman said such a device "is years away from mass production or for widespread use." Furthermore, neither Argonne nor any other research group envisioned sampling the air for viruses. Even DARPA's wild thinkers could not imagine how that could be done.

Even the simplest technological defense against biological weapons has proven to be too much for DOD contractors. In the spring of 2000, DOD officials revealed that the protective suits U.S. troops had relied on during the Persian Gulf War (and that still form the basis of soldiers' defense against deadly microbes) were defective. At least five percent of the 900,000 suits the DOD had purchased during the 1990s were useless, and the reliability of the entire inventory was suspect.

It seems unlikely, then, that a technological quick fix will soon be found. The three immediate American responses to bioterrorism -- military defense, hazardous-material defense teams, and high-technology sensors -- appear to be seriously flawed.

WHO'S IN CHARGE?

Consider this hypothetical scenario: the Red Army terrorist group successfully releases drug-resistant anthrax spores in the Bourse station of the Paris Metro at 8:00 am on a warm Wednesday in June. What would be the role of the French military, Surete (the French intelligence service), the Paris police, or any number of high-tech sensory devices? None.

The most important responders would not be the military or law enforcement officials. They would be the doctors, epidemiologists, ambulance drivers, nurses, and bureaucrats of the Paris public health system. It is they who would note -- days after the actual attack -- that large numbers of Parisians appeared to be ill, suffering similar symptoms. With further questioning they would perhaps realize that all the ailing individuals routinely took the same Metro train or stopped at the same station. Whether or not anyone would ever discover that terrorists had sprayed a lethal biological mist in the Bourse Metro station, it would be the public health workers who would track down and treat the patients, dispense appropriate drugs, determine whether the outbreak was spreading from the Bourse source, and analyze the microorganism for any special attributes.

Yet military-like responses have dominated Western government thinking, sparking recent outcries among defenders of civil liberties. During role-playing episodes in 1998-99, the DOD claimed the right to seize command during a bioterrorist attack -- a constitutionally shaky move. And on February 1, 1999, Defense Secretary William Cohen announced the creation of a special command within the DOD designed to coordinate responses to domestic bioterrorist attacks. Cohen's plans echoed the popular 1995 movie Outbreak, in which the U.S. Army declared martial law and took full control of an American city to limit the spread of an airborne form of the Ebola virus. Civil-liberties advocates responded to Cohen's announcement with indignation: Such a clear violation of the Constitution might be OK for Hollywood, they cried, but not for the real world.

President Clinton had tried to obviate such worries in his January 22, 1998, speech to the National Academy of Sciences. "We will be aggressive," he said, referring to his administration's response to the bioterrorist threat. "At the same time ... we will remain committed to uphold privacy rights and other constitutional protections, as well as the proprietary rights of American businesses. It is essential that we do not undermine liberty in the name of liberty." That day Clinton requested congressional approval of a $10 billion antiterrorism program, including $86 million for improving public health surveillance, $43 million for research on vaccines for anthrax, smallpox, and other potential bioweapons agents, and $300 million for stockpiles of essential drugs and vaccines. The proposed expenditures doubled the previous year's bioterrorism budget.

The job of building the nation's drug and vaccine warehouse fell to Margaret Hamburg, assistant secretary for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. She had to race to catch up with the DOD and the FBI. Public health was a late entrant to the bioterrorism field, she said, and significant dangers lurked in the developing antiterrorist infrastructure. Beyond the civil liberties issues that had already been voiced, Hamburg warned, "we don't want public health to be identified with the CIA and FBI activities. ... We in public health need to have public trust and confidence."

Already, local public health departments were having a hard time responding to fake bioterrorist attacks. Claiming to have dropped off or shipped an anthrax-containing device suddenly became chic at the turn of the millennium. Terrorism expert Jessica Stern counted 47 such hoaxes in the United States since 1992. In all 47 cases, local fire and police authorities reacted seriously, decontaminating thousands of people and appearing on the scenes dressed in full-body protection suits. And Stern's list was by no means comprehensive.

Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig warned that panic, in and of itself, is becoming the new terrorist tool. "Only through a new union of our public health, police, and military resources," he said, "can we hope to deal with this dangerous threat." But Hamburg worried that the police and FBI responses actually encourage such false alarms. It seems that bioterrorist hoaxes attract the type of individuals WHO enjoy watching fire departments douse buildings they have set afire. "When an envelope comes in saying 'This is anthrax,' we don't need the fire department in full protective gear on site," Hamburg insists. "What we need is to discreetly move the envelope to a public health laboratory for proper analysis. Mass decontamination and quarantine only [add] fuel to the fire of the hoax perpetrators, and it's totally unnecessary in terms of public health."

DIFFERENT DRUMMERS

It is obvious that public health, law enforcement, and defense officials have very different priorities in the event of a bioterrorist attack. For public health workers, the paramount concerns are limiting the spread of infection, identifying the cause of the disease, and if possible, treating and vaccinating the public. Law enforcement agents, however, are in the business of stopping and solving crimes -- and the scene of any bioterrorist incident is, first and foremost, a source of evidence. Managing a response to an outbreak thus poses a conflict of interest, since the police and the FBI would, by mandate, focus on detaining witnesses and obtaining evidence, even if those efforts ran counter to public health needs.

Even within the military itself, priorities blur when it comes to bioterrorism. The DOD's primary mission is to protect the United States against military foes. A secondary concern is to defend the health of American troops. How those priorities square with intervening -- and indeed, commanding -- responses to domestic bioterrorist attacks is not at all clear.

What is even less clear is how a public health system can respond to bioterrorism without destroying the basis of its credibility. When a public health system needs to intrude on individuals' lives to protect the larger community, it does so in limited ways and usually under the hard-and-fast promise of confidentiality. During an epidemic, for example, individuals may be asked to submit to blood tests and medical exams, and their medical charts may be scrutinized -- but all under the promise of confidentiality. In the long term, a public health system protects the community by monitoring disease trends, which requires tracking who has which diseases. Again, this information is generally stored under confidential or anonymous terms. On a global level, the WHO and a variety of other groups keep count of nations' diseases, monitoring for the emergence of new epidemics. After the 1995 Ebola outbreak in Zaire, for example, the WHO sought to create a more rigorous surveillance system and pushed countries to be more open about epidemics in their populations.

All of these functions, in all tiers of public health systems, require the maintenance of a crucial social contract: the individual or country agrees to openly disclose information for the sake of the larger community's health. In return, public health authorities promise never to abuse this trust, maintaining discretion and protecting patient privacy.

But the fear of bioterrorism threatens to destroy that vital social contract, which is not shared by law enforcement and defense officials. The closer a public health system draws to the other two systems, the greater the danger that it will lose credibility in the eyes of the public. Indeed, suspicions already run high in many American minority communities, prompting widespread belief that such microbes as the aids virus were created by the U.S. Public Health Service, the National Institutes of Health, or the CIA with the intention of obliterating key minority populations.

Some public health advocates are convinced that no marriage between their profession and law enforcement could ever work and have denounced all efforts to heighten concerns about bioterrorism. One prestigious group argues that "bioterrorist initiative programs are strongly reminiscent of the civil defense programs promoted by the U.S. government during the Cold War ... [that fostered] the delusion that nuclear war was survivable."

For many older public health leaders, the bioterrorism scare evokes nasty memories of Cold War cover-ups and censorship. By adopting thebioterrorism issue, they warn, public health officials are buying into a similar framework of paranoid thinking. Indeed, in 1999, biologists working in national laboratories found, for the first time, their work facing censorship in the wake of allegations of Chinese espionage at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. The Department of Energy (DOE), which oversees the national labs, clamped down so hard in 1999 that the National Academy of Sciences warned that the future of U.S. scientific enterprise could be imperiled. Although the DOE's primary concern was computer and nuclear secrecy, the threat of bioterrorism prompted the agency to broaden its new security restrictions to embrace basic biology research as well.

Many advocates argue that the public health system's role in the fight against bioterrorism can be comfortable only if it is an equal partner of the law enforcement and defense communities. One of the loudest voices speaking on behalf of public health in this regard is Michael Osterholm. In his new book, Living Terrors, Osterholm argues that "the overuse of the term 'weapons of mass destruction' (WMD) has done a great deal to stunt the necessary attention to the looming threat of biological terrorism." The WMD terminology places defense against bioterrorism in the hands of the military and the police, Osterholm insists. And that means, he says, "our priorities are really screwed up."

Osterholm's proposed solutions go to the heart of a larger public health agenda: to enhance the readiness and capacities of local, state, and federal health departments for responding to both natural and deliberately created epidemics. After all, Osterholm argues, it is impossible to tell at its outset whether an epidemic is a natural or ghoulishly unnatural event.

The new administration must work out these tensions among public health, law enforcement, and military authorities. The Clinton administration offered a broader definition of national security, bringing emerging infectious diseases and the aids pandemic under the security umbrella. That allowed agencies more traditionally concerned with terrorism, such as the National Security Council, the CIA, and the FBI, into the public health arena. A new administration may seek to redefine national security in more classic nation-state terms, or to sharpen the public health focus on diseases that directly affect terrorism and warfare. The future balance of authority and influence in the fight against bioterrorism will undoubtedly hinge on a new administration's larger view of national security.

Public health's role in the bioterrorism issue will also be better defined when its leaders come up with a clear consensus on what exactly they want. The issue is so new to most public health officials and raises so many uncomfortable questions that the profession is currently unable to speak with a clear, united voice. In contrast, the law enforcement and military communities appear comparatively determined and direct in their views of the bioterrorism threat and their desired responses to it.

In a historic speech in Atlanta during the winter of 1998, D. A. Henderson, head of Johns Hopkins University's Working Group on Civilian Biodefense, beckoned public health officials to jump on board a train already in motion, conducted by the law enforcement and defense communities. Less than a year later, public health had boarded the train, but only as a passenger. The train was fueled by an $8.4 billion budget in fiscal year 2000, yet public health was allotted a mere 3.7 percent of those funds, according to a recent study by the Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. With such comparatively paltry funding, it is no wonder that public health found itself sitting at the back of the train, watching the scenery race by as other government players steered the locomotive's course. Unless this changes, the train is going to crash.

Laurie Garrett is a Pulitzer Prize-winning science and medical writer for Newsday. This article is adapted from her new book, Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health. Copyright (c) 2000 by Laurie Garrett. Published by Hyperion.